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ABSTRACT
In this paper we present a replication and extension of the
study performed by Floreˆncio and Herley published at SOUPS
2010. They investigated a sample of US websites, examining
different website features’ effects on the strength of the web-
site’s password composition policy (PCP). Using the same
methodology as in the original study, we re-investigated the
same US websites to identify differences over time. We then
extended the initial study by investigating a corresponding
sample of German websites in order to identify differences
across countries. Our findings indicate that while the web-
site features mostly retain their predicting power for the US
sample, only one feature affecting PCP strength translates
to the German sample: whether users can choose among
multiple alternative websites providing the same service.
Moreover, German websites generally use weaker PCPs and,
in particular, PCPs of German banking websites stand out
for having generally low strength PCPs.
1. INTRODUCTION
Creating a password usually requires adherence to a pass-
word composition policy (PCP). Floreˆncio and Herley [5]
analysed the PCPs of 75 different websites in 2010 and re-
ported a high diversity. They investigated several website
features (e.g. whether the user name is publicly visible, the
value of the resources protected by the password, or whether
the website advertises on other websites) in order to iso-
late those features that influence the PCPs’ strength. They
found that the security-related features of a website did not
correlate with the PCPs’ strength. Instead, those websites
which were not affected by the consequences of bad usability
(e.g. government sites, because users have no alternative),
had the strongest PCPs.
However, it has been several years since their investigation
and one might wonder: Has the landscape of PCPs on the
Internet changed since their initial investigation? Have In-
ternet PCPs become more or less strict? Have the originally-
analysed features lost or gained influence on the strength of
PCPs? Also, the original study only examined US websites.
Copyright is held by the author/owner. Permission to make digital or hard
copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted
without fee.
Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS) 2017, July 12–14,
2017, Santa Clara, California.
Thus, it remains an open question whether the features have
the same influence on PCP strength of other countries’ web-
sites.
We decided to investigate these questions in a replication of
Floreˆncio and Herley’s study [5] (original study), extended
by the inclusion of a corresponding sample of German web-
sites. Thereby, our goal was not only to revisit the original
research questions of Floreˆncio and Herley [5], but to ex-
plore whether a comparison of PCPs over time, and across
country borders, yields new findings.
Our results indicate that the US PCPs have become, on
average, stronger in the intervening years. For the US sam-
ple, most features retain the predictive power with respect
to the strength of a website’s PCP found in the original
study. However, only one of the features used in the orig-
inal study emerges as a reliable predictor for the German
sample: websites facing a potential loss of users due to poor
usability are more likely to have weaker PCPs. Further-
more, German websites employ, on average, weaker PCPs
than US websites (see Figure 1). In particular, the PCPs
used by German banking websites are significantly weaker
than those of US banking websites and also exhibit the low-
est average PCP strength in the German sample. This find-
ing, combined with the identified predictive factor, “user has
choice” may indicate that German banks are especially keen
Figure 1: Histogram of PCP strengths (according to
the method used in [5]) of the three samples.
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to offer the most user-friendly experience in order to not lose
customers due to poor usability.
In the following, we first describe the original study by Floreˆn-
cio and Herley in detail and present related work. Then, we
describe the methodology of this replication study, including
our research questions. Thereafter, we present the results for
the individual samples in relation to our four research ques-
tions. The results are discussed with respect to our research
questions afterwards. Finally, we present the conclusions,
which we draw from this study.
2. ORIGINAL STUDY
In the original study, Floreˆncio and Herley [5] investigated
the strength of PCPs of 75 different US websites. They
sampled websites according to different categories: 15 top
traffic websites (determined by Quantcast1 traffic rank of 20
or higher), 8 high traffic websites (determined by Quantcast
traffic rank of 101 to 110), 8 medium traffic sites (determined
by Quantcast traffic rank 1001 to 1010), 9 banking websites
(the top ranked US banks and brokerages), 10 websites of
large universities (determined by their 2006 enrolment num-
bers), 10 websites of the universities with the top computer
science departments (determined as per U.S.News), the 10
government websites with the highest traffic (determined by
Quantcast traffic rank), and 7 miscellaneous sites “for com-
parison interest” [5]. Websites without account systems were
simply dropped from their sample. Two websites appeared
in two different categories each and were considered in both
categories during the analysis.
For all these websites, the PCPs were determined using the
following procedure. If possible, an account was created
on the website. In case this was not possible, the authors
relied on published password policies. To find them, they
performed a web search and considered only the first PCP
they found.
For each of the identified PCPs, they calculated the mini-
mum strength of the PCP using Nmin · log2 (Cmin) where
Nmin is the minimum length allowed by the PCP and Cmin
is the cardinality of the minimum character set required to
fulfil the PCP2. Their reasoning behind choosing a minimum
strength measure is that the intent of PCPs is to enforce a
minimum strength among passwords on a website and users
usually wont choose passwords which are much more secure.
They acknowledge that it is not a perfect measure and does
not model guessing resistance, but argue that it preserves
the ordering of PCPs in terms of burden on the user. In this
paper, we refer to the minimum strength of a PCP with-
out explicitly including the term minimum for readability’s
sake. We simply refer to it as PCP strength.
Using this sample of PCPs and their respective strengths,
they investigate the effects of the following website features:
1. Observation and evidence with regard to breaches.
1www.quantcast.com
2Note the following two aspects of the original methodology,
which were not explicitly mentioned in [5]: (1) if a password
requires special characters, Floreˆncio and Herley [5] used a
cardinality of 34 to calculate the PCP strength, regardless
of the number of special characters actually allowed by the
PCP, and (2) if a password allowed four character sets, but
required only 3, they included letters instead of special char-
acters in all instances.
2. The size of the service as determined by traffic rank
and number of users.
3. Whether the user name is public on the website.
4. The value of the resources protected based on the type
of website.
5. The extractable value of the resources protected based
on the monetisation of data gained from breaches.
6. Who lives with the consequences of a breach as deter-
mined by the policies of the websites.
7. Whether third party advertising is accepted on that
website as determined by the Quantcast advertising
information.
8. Whether the site advertises as determined by the use
of Google Sponsored Links of that website.
9. Whether the user can choose alternative websites of-
fering the same service.
Thereby, they argue that features related to security (i.e.
features 1-6) might increase the PCP strength and the fea-
tures related to attracting users (i.e. features 7-9) might
decrease PCP strength.
All their comparisons use the median as measure of central
tendency for the strength values. They find that none of the
security related features have an effect on PCP strength.
However, all features related to attracting users have the
anticipated effect, i.e. websites that either advertise them-
selves, display advertisements of third party websites, or
those where users can choose alternatives are more likely
to have weaker PCPs.
3. RELATED WORK
Aside from Floreˆncio and Herley’s study, several different
aspects of PCPs have been the focus of other studies. In the
following, we present selected related research.
Komanduri et al. [9] investigated the security and usability
properties of five different constructed (i.e. not taken from
the wild) PCPs in an online study. They found that rela-
tively simple password composition policies like mandating
at least 16 characters and no other restrictions (i.e. their
basic16 policy) yield much better security and usability re-
sults than mandating a length of at least 8 characters as well
as the usage of uppercase letters, lowercase letters, numbers
and symbols (i.e. their comprehensive8 policy).
Follow-up studies using similar constructed PCPs and focus-
ing on the security [8] or both, security and usability, [18,
19] of PCPs could replicate these findings: the typical com-
prehensive8 PCPs are among the weakest PCPs in terms of
guessing resistance and also exhibit unfavourable usability
properties. The authors recommend exchanging any com-
prehensive8 PCP in use with one of three alternatives they
identify in their study as exhibiting better security and bet-
ter usability properties.
Focusing on PCPs used by websites in the wild, Kuhn and
Garrison [10] conducted a survey of the difference in PCP
14    Thirteenth Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security USENIX Association
strength over a period of two years. Their assessment of se-
curity was based solely on the minimum length of the pass-
word mandated by the PCP and therefore uses a much sim-
pler measure than Floreˆncio and Herley [5] in their study.
They found that more websites used PCPs in 2009 than in
2007 and that the mandatory length of passwords imposed
by those PCPs increased in the same time frame.
Employing a similar methodology for the selection of their
PCP sample as Floreˆncio and Herley, Seitz et al. [17] anal-
ysed the PCPs of the top 100 German websites (according to
Alexa rankings). Their focus however, was to evaluate the
potential of password reuse among these sites. They found
that despite the great diversity among the PCPs, it is fairly
easy to find a password that can be reused on virtually all
websites.
Also considering the traffic rank of websites as an impor-
tant factor, Preibusch and Bonneau [16] find that high traffic
rank websites (determined by Alexa ranks) are more likely
to attempt to prohibit password sharing among users by
blocking listings of credentials at the password sharing com-
munity bugmenot.com.
Focusing on the practical aspects of password security, Floreˆn-
cio et al. [6] summarise the password research relevant for
system administrators. They present findings relating to the
guessing resistance required to withstand oﬄine and online
attacks and also discuss implementation details such as ap-
propriate hash functions. They advise to consider in the
formulation of PCPs, that oﬄine guessing attacks are much
less frequent than originally thought and that online guess-
ing attacks should be the focus when it comes to determining
the guessing resistance of passwords.
In another work focused at practitioners, Zhang-Kennedy
et al. [25] investigate long standing password management
and composition rules. They discuss the viability of these
rules based on the results of current research. Based on their
findings, they introduce an updated set of password rules,
aimed at decreasing the burden on users.
Aiming at increasing the security of existing PCPs in prac-
tice, Blocki et al. [2] describe a theoretical model for op-
timising password composition policies by maximising the
PCP’s minimum entropy from a set of sample passwords
chosen by users.
4. METHODOLOGY
In conducting our replication of the original study by Floreˆn-
cio and Herley [5], we computed the strength of the PCPs
used in 2016 on those US websites used in the original study
and re-investigated correlations between the websites’ fea-
tures as identified in [5]. We also applied their approach
to a corresponding German sample. We chose a German
sample in addition to the US ones for technical reasons: as
Germans we can easily understand the PCP descriptions and
conduct follow-up studies.
The purpose of our study is to investigate to which extent
the results of the original study can be generalised across
time and different countries, i.e. for which website features
there exist differences between samples and where there exist
none. Based on the results of our analyses, we answer the
following questions:
RQ1: Has the average PCP strength in the US sample
changed since the original study?
RQ2: Do the effects of the website features on the PCP
strength from the original study still apply to the USA
2016 sample?
RQ3: How do the German and US samples compare in
terms of PCP strength?
RQ4: Do the effects of the website features on the PCP
strength from the original study translate to the Ger-
man sample?
To ensure comparability with the original study, we em-
ployed the methodology as used by Floreˆncio and Herley
[5] as closely as possible. However, in order to render our
investigation viable and its results meaningful, we needed to
adapt the methodology in some respects. In the following,
we detail the alterations to the original study’s methodol-
ogy. Where not stated differently, we replicated the original
methodology as described in section 2. All PCP data was
collected in January 2016.
4.1 Identification of US Website Samples
For the US sample, we used the 75 websites from the original
sample of Floreˆncio and Herley [5]. Five of these were ex-
cluded from our investigation due to the following reasons:
highschoolsports.net was no longer available at the time of
the survey, youtube.com now uses the google.com user ac-
count system, ask.com as well as hollywood.com seem no
longer to have a user account system, and typepad.com did
not provide information about its PCP on the website. Ac-
count creation would have required us to provide payment
details. The remaining 70 websites were all included in our
investigation. A list of all websites in the US sample can be
found in the appendix in Table 5.
4.2 Identification of German Website Sample
We collected a comparative sample of 67 German websites.
A list of all websites can be found in the appendix in Table
6. The websites were collected according to the categories
defined in the original study: top, high, and medium traffic
sites as well as banks, universities and government websites.
We did not consider the miscellaneous category for the col-
lection of the German sample due to its ambiguity. In the
following, we describe the collection of the German website
sample in detail.
German Top, High, and Medium Traffic Websites.
Floreˆncio and Herley used the traffic rank information from
the Quantcast service to identify top, high, and medium traf-
fic websites. However, the service does not seem to provide
reliable traffic rankings for German websites. While the site
offers a list of the top 100 German websites, it does not seem
to be representative of actual usage, e.g. none of the search
engines included in popular browsers (Google, Bing, and Ya-
hoo) appear. We thus used the alternative Alexa3 rankings,
since their list of German website rankings seemed much
more representative and they have also been used in other
pertinent studies (e.g. [17, 16]).
3www.alexa.com/topsites/countries/DE
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Analogously to the original study, we used the ranks 1 to
20 and 101 to 110 for the top and high traffic categories
respectively. Since the Alexa service only provides the 500
most visited websites, it was impossible to choose the ranks
1001 to 1010 for the medium traffic websites, as chosen in
the original study. Therefore, we approximated by using the
last ten ranks provided by Alexa4. As in the original study,
websites without account systems were discarded.
German Banking Websites. For the banking category,
we chose several of the largest banks in Germany [4, 11].
Unfortunately, some banks do not offer information about
their policies on their websites. Therefore, we could only
include four of the ten largest traditional German banks
(i.e. banks with brick and mortar branch offices) and five of
the ten largest German online-only banks (i.e. banks with
no branch offices and only an online presence).
German University Websites. The German university
websites used in this study represent the largest German
universities, based on official government statistics [22]. The
websites of the best-rated computer science departments are
based on the CHE university ranking [24].
German Government Websites. Floreˆncio and Herley
used the ten highest traffic websites with a .gov top-level do-
main. Germany does not have an equivalent to the US .gov
domain, so we resorted to a different identification proce-
dure. First, we manually identified the government websites
on the Alexa list of the 500 most frequently-visited websites.
This yielded only 5 government websites with an account
system. To gather additional government websites for our
sample we consulted a report comprising an extensive list
of German government websites [14]. Using this list, we
were able to identify an additional three websites with user
account systems.
4.3 Identification of PCPs
The approach we took in order to identify the PCPs of both
samples (USA 2016 and GER 2016) was similar to the one
applied in the original study. Where possible, we created an
account on the website5. Sometimes we used demo accounts
to check the password policies. If neither of these approaches
was possible, a web search was used to locate the PCP. For
the US websites with multiple account systems, we used the
PCPs for the same account systems as used in the original
study, to support a meaningful comparison. On German
websites with multiple account systems, we used the first
PCP we found (analogously to the original study).
4.4 Website Accepts Advertising
We collected data regarding the placement of advertisements
on the website. The original study relied on the advertis-
ing info provided by the Quantcast service to decide whether
websites displayed advertisements from third party websites.
4Note, we can report Alexa ranks for the websites of the
other categories in our sample, since it is possible to query
the Alexa database for any website to get its rank. The
identification of the medium traffic websites is hindered since
the inverse is not possible (i.e. querying the Alexa database
with a specific rank to get the corresponding website).
5Note, in some cases, it was not possible to create an actual
account, but instead only to carry out the registration pro-
cess. While no account was created, this process still gave
us access to the PCP.
Figure 2: Scatterplot showing the difference in
PCP strength (as determined by minimum password
strength) for the US sample over time. Each point
represents one website. The websites above the di-
agonal have adopted a stricter PCP since 2010, the
websites below the diagonal have adopted a more
lenient PCP.
This information is no longer available. We applied a man-
ual approach. We visited each of the websites and navi-
gated through the pages. If we found any advertisements,
we categorised the respective website as having this feature,
otherwise not.
5. RESULTS
In this section, we first present the results for the PCP’s
strength and then the results for the nine features6 from
the original study and their effects. Note that we refer re-
peatedly to the three samples, which relates to our German
website sample (GER 2016) and our updated US website
sample (USA 2016) as well as the US website sample from
the original study (USA 2010). All correlations reported
here were calculated using Pearson’s correlation coefficient
r using the R statistics system. Table 1 gives an overview
of the investigated effects, the results of the original study,
and the results of our own investigation.
5.1 Strengths of PCPs
The average strength of the US sample has grown signifi-
cantly from 35.7 bits in 2010 to 41.4 bits in 2016, whereas
the maximum values have declined from 79.0 bits to 71.5
bits respectively. The increase in average PCP strength is
caused by 37 websites adopting a stronger PCP than in 2010,
while only 8 websites adopted a weaker PCP. The remain-
ing 25 websites did not change their PCP from 2010 to 2016.
Figure 2 depicts the change in PCP strength over time in
the US samples.
6We wont motivate the individual features in this work. In-
stead, we would like to refer the interested reader to the
description in the original study [5] for a detailed descrip-
tion explaining the selection.
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Table 1: Overview of the investigated website features and their hypothesised as well as actual effects on
PCP strength. “↑” indicates an increase in strength, “↓” indicates a decrease in strength, “-” indicates no
effect.
Hypothesised effect Actual effect on PCP strength
Website feature on PCP strength [5] USA 2010 USA 2016 GER 2016
Observation and evidence
↑
- - -
Size of the service - - -
User name public - - -
Value of the resources protected - - -
Extractable value of the resources protected - - -
Who lives with the consequences of a breach - - -
Advertising accepted
↓
↓ ↓ -
Site advertises ↓ - -
User has choice ↓ ↓ ↓
Table 2: The median PCP strengths of the websites in the three samples. German websites generally employ
weaker PCPs. In particular German banking websites stand out, exhibiting the lowest average in all three
samples.
Traffic Website type
Sample Overall Top High Medium Bank University Government Others
USA 2010 35.7 19.9 19.9 36.2 31.0 41.7 47.6 19.9
USA 2016 41.4 26.6 41.5 46.5 35.7 47.6 52.7 29.9
GER 2016 26.6 26.6 25.8 19.9 16.6 30.8 47.6 26.6
In comparison to the USA 2016 sample, the German 2016
sample shows a much smaller median of 26.6 bits and also a
slightly lower maximum of 59.3 bits. The minimum is equal
for all samples (3.3 bits), due to Wikipedia being present in
all samples. Figure 1 depicts the distribution of the PCP
strengths for all three samples. While the range decreased
in the US samples from 2010 (75.7 bits) to 2016 (68.1 bits)
and is even smaller for the German sample (55.9 bits), it
remains very large in all samples.
Table 2 shows the differences between the samples for the
different categories of websites distinguished in the original
study. It becomes apparent, that the average PCP strengths
have increased in the US sample for all categories. When
comparing the the two samples from 2016, German websites
employ on average weaker PCPs in every category. Figure
6 in the appendix illustrates the distributions of the PCP
strength per category of all three samples.
5.2 Observation and Evidence
One might argue that website providers learn from past
events and derive the PCPs from past experiences. Floreˆn-
cio and Herley approached this question in the original study
based on argumentation and while their arguments still hold
today, we also applied an evidence-based approach in our
investigation using information related to whether the US
websites had been affected by a password-related breach or
leak in the years between 2010 and 2016. To that end, we
conducted web searches for each website in the US sam-
ple, in order to identify whether it had been affected by a
password breach or leak since the original study. We used
the Google search engine with the search terms “password
breach”, “password leak”, “password hack”, and “password
incident”, each in combination with the respective website’s
name. If we found a security incident exposing password
data7 on the first five pages of search results, we classified
a website as having been victim of a breach or leak. Table
5 in the appendix shows the individual classification of each
website in the US sample. This classification is, admittedly,
only an approximation. Not all leaks are made public, which
decreases the precision of our approach.
Using the classification, we split the websites into three cate-
gories: those having increased the the strength of their PCPs
in the time between 2010 and 2016, those having reduced the
strength of their PCPs in that time frame, and those with no
change in their PCPs. We hypothesised that if websites op-
erated on their past evidence, then websites that had been
the target of a breach since 2010 would be more likely to
have increased the strength of their PCPs. Table 3 shows
the frequencies of websites classified as detailed above.
We conducted a Fisher’s exact test to investigate the effect
of websites being affected by a breach on the PCP strength
of those websites. It yielded no significant results (FET:
p = 0.415). Thus, the hypothesis that past breaches have
an effect on PCP strength has to be rejected.
5.3 Size of the Service
Floreˆncio and Herley [5] hypothesised that PCP strength
correlates with (a) the size of a website (as determined by
the number of user accounts on that site) and (b) the traffic
generated by the website (as determined by the Quantcast
traffic rank, see section 2 for details). They reject these
hypotheses based on the observation that top-traffic services
7Indirect attacks such as abusing reset mechanisms were not
considered a breach or leak in the sense of our investigation
since the actual password is not revealed when security ques-
tions are easily guessed. Also, attacks leaking passwords
in the clear (such as phishing) were not considered, since
stronger passwords do not protect against these kinds of at-
tacks.
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Table 3: Frequencies of websites classified along the
two characteristics: (a) whether a website has been
victim of a breach or not and (b) whether the web-
site uses a stronger, weaker, or unchanged PCP.
PCP is
Stronger Unchanged Weaker
Breach 13 6 1
No breach 24 19 7
with many users (such as Facebook or GMail) have much
weaker PCPs than universities which have significantly lower
traffic ranks and also lower numbers of users (approximated
from undergraduate enrolment). Since the traffic ranks in
2016 do not match the original sampling and in some cases
deviate significantly from their 2010 ranks (e.g. Myspace
had rank 16 in 2010 and ~1000 in 2016), a direct comparison
is not possible.
However, since the original study, the top traffic websites
have increased their number of users, e.g. Facebook from
~400 million to ~1700 million [21] or GMail from 91 million
to 1000 million [20]. In contrast, in the same time frame
the number of student enrolments remained steady for the
lower traffic examples used by Floreˆncio and Herley [5], e.g.
Ohio State University 51800 in 2010 and 51759 in 2016 [15].
Hence Floreˆncio and Herley’s argument seems to hold. How-
ever, it must be acknowledged that the measure chosen by
Floreˆncio and Herley for the approximation of the number of
university user accounts (i.e. undergraduate student enrol-
ments) might not be optimal (see section 7 for a discussion
of this limitation).
In addition, we conducted a correlation analysis for our Ger-
man sample based on the Alexa ranks. We found a weak
negative correlation between the Alexa ranks of the web-
sites in the German sample and the strength of their PCPs
(r = −0.16). Thus, our results support the findings of the
original study for the German sample as well.
5.4 User Name Public
When user names are publicly available, bulk guessing at-
tacks, where attackers try only the most frequent passwords
for all accounts known to them, become much more viable.
Therefore, Floreˆncio and Herley hypothesised that websites
with public user names might employ PCPs with a higher
average strength. They assumed social networks’, auction
websites’ and email providers’ user names to be public and
stated that for universities the user name is often public
as well. For the US sample, the findings from the original
study can be directly transferred: a Wilcoxon rank sum test
results in rejecting the hypothesis that there is a difference
in PCP strength between websites with public user names
and websites where user names are not publicly accessible
(W = 648.5, p = 0.674).
For the German sample it is of note that university user
names do not seem to be public in general. Some universi-
ties from our sample use the student id number (e.g. Fer-
nUniversita¨t Hagen), the student email address (e.g. Goethe
Universita¨t Frankfurt) or personal information such as first
and last name (e.g. Universita¨t Ko¨ln), and this might make
bulk guessing easier. However, there are also universities in
our sample which explicitly use random user names (e.g. TU
Figure 3: Histograms for the three samples, show-
ing the distributions for websites that display third
party advertisements and those that do not.
Darmstadt or Universita¨t des Saarlandes). In particular, for
most German universities this information is not publicly
available. However, even with this difference, a Wilcoxon
rank sum test results in a rejection of the hypothesis that
there is a difference in PCP strength between websites with
public user names and websites where user names are not
publicly accessible (W = 456.5, p = 1.000). Our findings
fully support the findings of the original study for all sam-
ples.
5.5 Value of the Resources Protected
While investigating the values of the resources protected in
the USA 2016 sample, the same trend already described in
the original study became apparent. Financial services have,
on average, more lenient PCPs than government websites.
In particular, the same example from the original study still
holds. Both, Fidelity (increase in PCP strength since 2010)
and Paypal (no difference in PCP strength since 2010), still
have weaker PCPs than USAJobs (no difference since 2010).
Table 2 shows the average PCP strengths of banking web-
sites for all samples. German banking websites have the low-
est average PCP strengths of all three samples (16.6 bits).
US banking websites have significantly higher average PCP
strengths in both 2010 and 2016.
5.6 Extractable Value of the Resources
Protected
Floreˆncio and Herley hypothesise that the extractable value
of user accounts might increase the PCP strength of respec-
tive websites. To identify the websites considered the most
valuable, they consider those heavily targeted by phishers,
since they argue that these represent the websites whose
accounts offer the best monetisation. In contrast to their
hypothesis, they find that the most phished brands in 2009
all have relatively low strength PCPs.
For the extractable value of the resources protected by the
respective passwords, we see the same effects as described
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Table 4: The median PCP strengths of the websites
in the three samples in relation to whether they ac-
cept third party advertisements, whether the web-
sites advertise themselves, and whether the user can
choose alternative websites.
Accepts ads Advertises User choice
Sample Yes No Yes No Yes No
USA 2010 19.9 41.1 31.0 35.7 19.9 41.6
USA 2016 19.9 47.6 47.6 41.4 26.6 47.6
GER 2016 26.6 26.6 22.9 26.6 26.2 31.0
in the original study. According to the APWG [1], financial
websites are still among the ones most heavily targeted by
phishers. Close to 19% of phishing attacks target this sector.
In contrast, less than 2% of attacks target government and
education websites, both of which have much higher average
PCP strengths.
5.7 Who Lives with the Consequences of a
Breach
When a service has to compensate users for possible conse-
quences, this financial threat could be a reason for website
providers to enforce stronger PCPs. As noted in the origi-
nal study, this was not the case in 2010. Our investigation
provides even more evidence in this regard. Banks are still
among the websites employing weak PCPs in all samples
(in particular in the German sample). Yet they often com-
pensate users for unauthorised transactions [5]. In Germany,
account holders only have to cover the first 150AC themselves.
Our investigation fully supports the original study’s findings.
5.8 Advertising Accepted
Some websites generate their revenue through third party
advertisements. Table 4 shows the median PCP strengths
for the websites displaying third-party advertisements and
the ones that do not. The US samples underline the findings
of the original study: a Wilcoxon rank sum test indicated
that websites displaying third-party advertisements had sig-
nificantly weaker PCPs than those that did not display ad-
vertisements in the USA 2016 sample (W = 759.0, p <
0.001). It is interesting to note that the median PCP strengths
for the websites accepting advertising did not change from
2010 to 2016. The overall increase in the USA 2016 sample
stems solely from websites not displaying advertisements.
However, for the German sample, displaying adverts does
not seem to have a significant effect on the average PCP
strength. The median values for both groups of websites are
the same as the overall median strength of 26.6 bits already
reported in section 5.1. Consequently, a Wilcoxon rank sum
test results in a rejection of the hypothesis that there is a dif-
ference in PCP strength between websites displaying third-
party adverts and those that do not display third-party ad-
verts in the German sample (W = 554.5, p = 0.617). Figure
3 illustrates this effect across all three samples.
5.9 Site Advertises
To generate traffic, some websites place advertisements on
other websites. As an indicator of whether websites place
such ads, we use (analogously to the original study) Google
sponsored links. Figure 4 shows the distributions of PCP
strength of websites utilising Google sponsored links and
Figure 4: Histograms for the three samples, showing
the distributions for websites that are advertising
using sponsored links on Google Search and those
that do not advertise using sponsored links.
those that do not do this for all three samples. Again, there
is no visible effect for this feature in the German sample;
both median PCP strength values are almost identical at
26.6 bits for the non-advertising sites and 26.3 for the adver-
tising sites (cf. Table 4). A Wilcoxon rank sum test supports
this finding, resulting in a rejection of the hypothesis that
there is a difference between advertising and non-advertising
websites in the German sample (W = 505.0, p = 0.366).
In the USA 2016 sample, a Wilcoxon rank sum test results
in rejecting the hypothesis that there is a difference in PCP
strength between advertising and non-advertising websites
as well (W = 297.0, p = 0.667). However, while not sig-
nificant, the results might indicate a weak reversal effect,
illustrated by Figure 4: in 2010, non-advertising websites
had the higher average PCP strength, in 2016 the adver-
tising websites have the higher average PCP strength (cf.
Table 4).
5.10 User Has Choice
Concerning whether the user has a choice to use the website,
the results are consistent for all three samples. Wilcoxon
rank sum tests indicated that websites where users can choose
between alternatives have significantly weaker PCPs than
those where users have no choice for both, the USA 2016
sample (W = 976.5, p < 0.001) as well as the German sam-
ple (W = 780.0, p = 0.004). When comparing the two sam-
ples from 2016, German websites without alternatives for
the user, unsurprisingly, have a lower PCP strength than
the corresponding US websites. On the other hand, there
is no difference between the websites of both samples where
users can choose alternatives. Thus, the feature seems to
have a similar effect on the strength of the PCPs in all three
samples.
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Figure 5: Histograms for the three samples, show-
ing the distributions for websites where users can
choose an alternative website and where users have
no choice.
6. DISCUSSION
In our replication study, we re-investigated the effects of sev-
eral website features on the strength of websites’ PCPs. The
goal of this replication was not only to revisit the original
research questions of Floreˆncio and Herley [5], but to explore
whether a comparison of PCPs over time and across country
borders yields new findings. We discuss the findings related
to each of our research questions in the following.
6.1 Has the average PCP strength in the US
sample changed since the original study?
Based on the data from our replication of Floreˆncio and
Herley’s study [5], the answer to the first research question
is a definitive “yes”. The average PCP strength in the US
sample has risen from 35.7 bits to 41.4 bits since the original
study. 52.9% of the websites use 2016 stronger PCPs than
they did in 2010. In contrast, only 11.4% of the websites
used weaker PCPs.
While this trend supports similar findings by Kuhn and Gar-
rison [10], it contradicts established expert opinion: NIST’s
newly drafted rules regarding password security [7] recom-
mend using a PCP with “at least 8 characters” and “no
other complexity requirements for memorized secrets”. Such
a PCP has a minimum strength of 26.56 bits. The US av-
erage from 2016 is at 41.1 bits 35.8% higher than this rec-
ommendation. Therefore, it seems that PCPs found in the
wild are much more complex (as determined by Floreˆncio
and Herley’s measure) than what is recommended. Such
overly complex PCPs might be, usability-wise, alarming.
The reasons for this rise in PCP strength, however, cannot
be identified from the data collected in our study. As in
the original study, all hypotheses regarding factors increas-
ing PCP strength had to be rejected. Thus, no explanation
for the rise in PCP strength emerges from the original hy-
potheses. Furthermore, our additional investigation into the
effects of breaches on PCP strength reveals that the observ-
able rise in PCP strength between 2010 and 2016 cannot
be attributed to the website being breached either. Conse-
quentially, other features must be the driving force behind
the rise in PCP strength. While it might be that website
providers try to counter increasing attacker capabilities for
oﬄine attacks by employing stronger PCPs, this would con-
tradict Floreˆncio et al’s . [6] recommendations to focus on
online guessing when designing PCPs, which is better ad-
dressed with lock-out policies. Yet the identification of the
influential features, in this regard, constitutes one important
focus for future work.
6.2 Do the effects of the website features on
the PCP strength from the original study still
apply to the USA 2016 sample?
Regarding the answer to our second research question, the
results from our study concur with the findings of the orig-
inal study for all features except one. All website features,
which Floreˆncio and Herley hypothesised to increase PCP
strength, still do not have that effect. Also, websites that
display third party advertisements and websites where users
can choose alternatives still have significantly weaker PCPs.
The only divergence from the findings in the original study is
related to whether websites advertise to attract users. This
feature seems to have lost its effect on the PCP strength.
The reasons for this divergence, however, remain unclear.
6.3 How do the German and US samples com-
pare in terms of PCP strength?
With respect to the third research question, the answer we
can give from the results of our study is that websites in the
German 2016 sample employ in every category on average
weaker PCPs than those in the USA 2016 sample. For the
three categories medium-traffic, banking, and education, the
websites in the German 2016 sample have even lower average
PCP strengths than the websites of those categories in the
US sample had in 2010. Especially German banking web-
sites stand out in this regard: While the passwords on these
websites protect the most (monetary) value, they are cre-
ated under the PCPs exhibiting the lowest average strength
across all three samples.
However, one important aspect regarding German banking
websites is that they implement two-factor transaction au-
thorisation. The notable difference to two-factor authenti-
cation is that users can log in (authenticate) without the
second factor, but authorising transactions requires a sec-
ond factor (usually a so-called TAN, a transaction number
for one-time use delivered either in advance e.g. as a list of
TANs via mail or nowadays on demand e.g. via smartphone
apps). Thus, the actual extraction of resources requires more
than mere knowledge of the password, but carrying out this
kind of attack is not impossible [12]. To gain further in-
sight, we contacted a local bank. Their perspective is that
tight lock-out policies and high security data centres made
strong PCPs unnecessary. Hence, the trade-off of employ-
ing a lower-strength PCP in conjunction with tight lock-out
policies and two-factor authorisation might be, usability-
wise, a favourable trade-off. Whether users agree with this
perspective and find such lower strength PCPs adequate for
protection in the banking context remains an open question
that we cannot answer without further investigation.
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6.4 Do the effects of the website features on
the PCP strength from the original study trans-
late to the German sample?
The results of our study indicate that the effect of only one
feature translates to the German sample. User choice is
the only feature affecting the PCP strength in the German
sample. When a user can choose alternatives to a certain
website, that website is more likely to employ a weaker
PCP. However, in contrast to the US samples, the display
of adverts does not seem to have a significant effect on PCP
strength in the German sample. Neither the display of ad-
vertisements, nor using adverts to attract users, has a sig-
nificant effect on the PCP strength of websites in the Ger-
man sample. Our data does not suggest any explanations
for this. Regarding the effects of features hypothesised to
increase PCP strength, all hypotheses had to be rejected.
This confirms the findings of the original study.
Therefore, we argue that only two factors truly influence the
strength of a website’s PCP across the three samples: (1) a
general tendency to enforce PCPs which are as strong as pos-
sible, and (2) the dependence on usability to attract users,
leading to weaker policies. As already pointed out by Floreˆn-
cio and Herley in the original study, and further supported
by the findings of this replication, this trade-off is decided by
websites more or less off-the-cuff. This holds for the US and
German samples. To illustrate for the US sample: the range
among US universities is 39.2 bits in 2016. However, it is
unclear, why Princeton (PCP strength of 65.8 bits) should
feel the need to enforce a significantly stronger PCP than
Northwestern University (PCP strength of 26.6 bits). With
respect to the German sample, the average strength of the
PCPs seems, with 26.6 bits, to be very close to NIST’s rec-
ommendation (26.56 bits). However, the large range of 55.9
bits across PCP strengths and, in particular, high strength
PCPs on seemingly low value sites (e.g. 47.6 bits for the
news site spiegel.de) give rise to doubt regarding a more
systematic approach being applied to PCP choice on Ger-
man websites.
7. LIMITATIONS
As already acknowledged by Floreˆncio and Herley [5], the
minimum PCP strength measure employed in their study
can only serve as a rough estimation and more precise mea-
sures of guessing resistance exist. However, as Floreˆncio and
Herley pointed out in the original study, their measure is not
intended to model resistance to guessing attacks, but only
complexity of the resulting passwords. Since we adopt this
measure to perform our replication, this limitation applies
to our study as well.
We also decided to not use any additional measures of pass-
word security, since any reliable estimate of a PCPs strength
(e.g. α-guesswork [3] or guess numbers [23]) would require
collecting passwords created under the respective PCP. How-
ever, collecting adequate numbers of passwords for the cal-
culation of these measures is beyond the scope of this work.
Another limitation that arises from adopting the original
methodology and the nature of performing a replication is
that PCP strength is only investigated in relation to the web-
site features. The effects of other influencing factors such as
technologies employed by the user (e.g. two-factor authen-
tication, password managers, etc.) are not considered. Es-
pecially, two-factor authentication might play a role in some
categories: as explained before in section 6.3 German banks
require the user to provide a second factor to authorise trans-
actions. It must be assumed that this influences the PCP
choice of banks. However, other factors might play a role
here as well. For example, traditional banks (i.e. banks with
brick and mortar branch offices) might have relatively strict
lockout policies, since their customers can simply visit the
local branch office to get their account unlocked. Therefore,
while future study designs should include these interesting
extensions of the methodology and consider such technolo-
gies, it was beyond the scope of this replication study.
The third limitation of our replication study is also shared
with the original study. For the identification of the PCPs in
our samples, we followed the same methodology as Floreˆncio
and Herley. Thus, we also created an account at the website
whenever possible (the information whether an account was
created is available for each of the websites in our samples
in tables 5 and 6 in the appendix). However, when this
was not possible we also followed the methodology of the
original study and conducted a web search. This can lead
to imprecisions in the samples, since sometimes the found
PCPs might represent guidelines not enforced during the
actual password choice or for a university might only be
enforced for a specific account system, but not for others.
The final limitation that our replication study shares with
the original study is the approximation of user accounts at
universities by undergraduate enrolment numbers. Using
purely these numbers might not be optimal, since the num-
ber of accounts managed by universities nowadays might
only loosely correlate with the number enrolled undergradu-
ate students due to the emergence of other account systems
at the universities (e.g. affiliated research institutes, alumni,
donors, or even accounts for the purchase of sports tickets)8.
However, we argue that this does not affect our results, since
even if the undergraduate enrolment is not fully represen-
tative of the number of user accounts at universities, it is
unlikely that universities reach the numbers of users of the
top traffic websites.
A limitation arising from the longitudinal analysis is that
we decided to use the same websites as the original study
for the USA 2016 sample instead of collecting a new sample
from the same categories. Therefore, some of the websites
now belong to a different category. However, we decided to
use the same website, since this affects less than 1/10 of the
sample and we believe the longitudinal comparison (enabled
only by using the same websites) adds special value to this
paper.
Lastly, the additional breach analysis we conducted (cf. sec-
tion 5.2) should only be treated as an approximation. While
some countries have passed laws mandating the reporting of
data breaches (cf. e.g. [13]), this does not hold for all juris-
dictions and consequentially not all leaks are made public.
Moreover, our search terms might have been insufficient to
identify all available information on breaches at the respec-
tive sites.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a replication of the study by
Floreˆncio and Herley [5]. Thereby, the contribution of our
8Thanks to reviewer 1 for pointing this out.
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paper is twofold: (1) the comparison of password composi-
tion policies in the US sample over time, and (2) the compar-
ison of password composition policies across country borders
(i.e. between Germany and the US).
Regarding the first contribution, it became apparent that
US PCPs have become, on average, stronger and that all
but one website feature have retained their effects on PCP
strength in the intervening years. While the former is in line
with the findings of similar studies [10], it contradicts estab-
lished expert opinion and might be, in terms of usability, an
alarming finding. Moreover, our results indicate that two
website features correlate with decreased PCP strength in
the USA 2016 sample (i.e. “advertising accepted” and “user
has choice”), but none of the website features seem to cor-
relate with increased PCP strength in practice. Therefore,
future work is needed to identify the reasons behind the rise
in PCP strength in the US from 2010 to 2016. With respect
to the effects of the website features on PCP strength in the
US samples, only the effect associated to whether websites
advertise to attract users seems to have changed. The effect
could not be found in the 2016 sample.
Regarding the second contribution, we observed, on average,
lower PCP strengths in the German sample than in the US
samples. German banks stand out as having particularly
weak PCPs. Together with the fact that “User has choice”
emerges as the only website feature exhibiting an effect in
the German sample, it seems that German banks are espe-
cially keen to maximise usability and optimise the user ex-
perience. They provide the user with a favourable trade-off
by combining tight lock-out policies with the requirement of
a second factor to authorise transactions. However, whether
users consider this trade-off adequate for the banking con-
text, or might even want to make similar trade-offs in other
contexts as well, is open for future investigation.
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Table 5: The US website sample (USA 2016) comprising 70 websites. Traffic ranks according to Quantcast.
Website
Traffic Account Min. Size Min. Strength Accepts Places User Affected
Rank Created?. Length Charset 2016 2010 Ads? Ads? Choice by Breach
Top Traffic Sites
Google 1 y 8 10 26,6 26,6 y n y n
Facebook 2 y 6 10 19,9 19,9 y n y n
Yahoo 3 y 9 10 29,9 19,9 y n y y
AOL 6 y 8 10 26,6 26,6 y n y y
Live 8 y 8 36 41,4 19,9 y n y y
Wikipedia 9 y 1 10 3,3 3,3 n n y n
eBay 10 y 6 36 31,0 31,0 y n y y
Amazon 11 y 6 10 19,9 19,9 y y y y
weather 13 y 6 10 19,9 19,9 y n y n
answers 15 y 6 10 19,9 3,3 y n y n
Myspace 16 y 6 10 19,9 31,0 n n y n
Craigslist 17 y 8 26 37,6 19,9 n n y n
adobe 20 y 8 62 47,6 19,9 n y y y
High Traffic Sites
nih.gov 101 n 8 62 47,6 47,6 n n n n
capitalone.com 102 n 8 36 41,4 41,4 n y n n
rockyou.com 103 y 6 10 19,9 41,4 y n y n
overstock.com 107 y 8 36 41,4 16,6 n n y n
latimes.com 108 y 7 36 36,2 19,9 y n y n
intuit.com 109 y 8 96 52,7 19,9 n y y y
cbssports.com 110 y 4 10 13,3 13,3 y n y n
Medium Traffic Sites
wowwiki.com 1001 y 1 10 3,3 3,3 y n y n
virginia.edu 1002 n 8 62 47,6 36,2 n n n n
pgatour.com 1003 y 6 10 19,9 3,3 y n y n
mit.edu 1006 n 8 36 41,4 31,0 n n n n
okcupid.com 1007 y 5 10 16,6 13,3 y n y n
istockphoto.com 1008 y 8 36 41,4 25,8 n y y n
Banks
Fidelity 224 n 8 62 47,6 19,9 n y n n
Vanguard 629 n 8 10 26,6 26,6 n n n n
Schwab 2266 n 6 36 31,0 31,0 n y n n
WellsFargo 80 n 6 36 31,0 31,0 n n n n
BoA 48 n 8 36 41,4 41,4 n n n n
J P Morgan Chase 2186 n 8 86 51,4 36,2 n n n n
Citibank 316 n 6 62 35,7 31,0 n n n n
PayPal 29 y 8 10 26,6 26,6 n n y n
US Bank 316 n 8 36 41,4 26,6 n n n n
Large Universities
Ohio State U 1811 n 8 62 47,6 41,4 n y n n
Arizona State U 3288 n 10 62 59,5 47,6 n y n y
U. of Florida 1382 n 8 62 47,6 47,6 n n n n
U. of Minn. 919 n 6 36 31,0 35,7 n n n n
U. of Texas 946 n 8 62 47,6 47,6 n n n n
U. of Central Florida 6313 n 8 96 52,7 47,6 n n n y
Michigan State U. 1174 n 8 62 47,6 47,6 n n n n
Texas A & M 1418 n 8 62 47,6 35,7 n n n y
U. South Florida 2364 n 8 62 47,6 35,7 n n n n
Penn. State U. 977 n 8 36 41,4 41,4 n n n y
Universities with top CS departments
MIT 1006 n 8 36 41,4 31,0 n n n n
Stanford 858 n 8 96 52,7 47,6 n n n y
UC Berkeley 905 n 9 36 46,5 41,4 n n n n
CMU 3651 n 8 96 52,7 52,0 n n n n
Continued on next page
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Table 5 – continued from previous page
Website
Traffic Account Min. Size Min. Strength Accepts Places User Affected
Rank Created?. Length Charset 2016 2010 Ads? Ads? Choice by Breach
UIUC 3384 n 8 62 47,6 26,1 n n n n
Cornell 955 n 8 62 47,6 41,7 n n n y
Princeton 1879 n 10 96 65,8 52,7 n n n y
U. of Washington 1032 n 8 36 41,4 45,6 n n n n
Georgia Tech. 4687 n 11 62 65,5 47,6 n n n n
U. of Texas 946 n 8 62 47,6 47,6 n n n y
Government Sites
irs.gov 63 n 8 70 49,0 47,6 n n n y
usps.com 68 y 10 75 62,3 47,6 n n n n
nih.gov 101 n 8 62 47,6 47,6 n n n n
ca.gov 124 n 8 96 52,7 47,6 n n n n
ed.gov 141 y 8 62 47,6 26,6 n n n n
noaa.gov 199 n 8 96 52,7 77,1 n n n n
weather.gov 228 n 12 62 71,5 77,1 n n n n
census.gov 246 n 12 62 71,5 47,6 n n n y
ssa.gov 276 n 7 36 36,2 36,2 n n n n
nasa.gov 342 n 12 62 71,5 79,0 n n n y
Other Sites
U. of Phoenix 873 y 8 62 47,6 36,2 n y y n
Columbia 1350 n 6 36 31,0 31,0 n y n n
Northwestern 4457 n 8 10 26,6 31,0 n n n n
VA 558 n 9 96 59,3 52,7 n n n n
USAJobs 590 y 8 96 52,7 52,7 n n y n
TreasuryDirect 2421 n 8 70 49,0 47,6 n n n y
Twitter 31 y 6 10 19,9 19,9 n n y y
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Table 6: The German website sample (GER 2016) comprising 67 websites. Traffic ranks according to Alexa.
Website
Traffic Account Min. Size Min. Accepts Places User
Rank created? Length Charset Strength Ads? Ads? Choice
Top Traffic Sites
Google.de 1 y 8 10 26,6 y n y
Amazon.de 2 y 6 10 19,9 y y y
Facebook.com 3 y 6 10 19,9 y n y
Ebay.de 5 y 6 36 31,0 y n y
Wikipedia 7 y 1 10 3,3 n n y
Web.de 8 y 8 10 26,6 y n y
Ebay-
kleinanzeigen.de
9 y 6 10 19,9 y n y
T-online.de 10 y 8 36 41,4 y n y
Gmx.net 11 y 8 10 26,6 y n y
Bild.de 13 y 6 10 19,9 y n y
Yahoo.com 14 y 9 10 29,9 y n y
Spiegel.de 15 y 8 62 47,6 y n y
Xhamster.com 17 y 4 10 13,3 y n y
Paypal.com 18 y 8 10 26,6 n n y
Focus.de 19 y 8 10 26,6 y n y
Live.com 20 y 8 36 41,4 y n y
High Traffic Sites
Mytoys.de 101 y 5 36 25,8 y y y
vodafone.de 102 y 8 36 41,4 n y n
aol.com 103 y 8 10 26,6 y n y
zdf.de 104 y 1 10 3,3 n n y
netflix.com 105 y 4 10 13,3 n n y
duden.de 106 y 6 96 39,5 y n y
eventim.de 107 y 5 10 16,6 n y y
xvideos.com 109 y 8 26 37,6 y n y
bonprix.de 110 y 6 10 19,9 n y y
Medium Traffic Sites
proxer.me 491 y 8 10 26,6 y n y
Auto-motor-und-
sport.de
493 y 5 10 16,6 y n y
pcgames.de 494 y 8 36 41,4 y n y
etsy.com 495 y 6 10 19,9 n y y
netdoktor.de 496 y 1 10 3,3 y n y
opodo.de 497 y 7 36 36,2 y y y
clipfish.de 499 y 5 10 16,6 y n y
Banks
Deutsche Bank 74 y 5 10 16.6 n y n
KfW 2017 y 8 62 47,6 n y n
NordLB 13002 y 5 10 16,6 n n n
Deutsche Postbank 37 y 5 10 16,6 n y n
Ing-diba 89 n 5 10 16,6 n y y
DKB 125 n 5 36 25,8 n y y
comdirect 132 y 7 36 36,2 n y y
Volkswagenbank 1816 y 8 10 26,6 n y y
Consorsbank 410 y 5 10 16,6 n y y
Large Universities
FU Hagen 1728 n 8 62 47,6 n y n
LMU Mu¨nchen 869 n 4 36 20,7 n n n
U Ko¨ln 979 n 6 36 31,0 n n n
Goethe U Frankfurt 1235 n 6 10 19,9 n n n
Ruhr U Bochum 4989 n 8 10 26,6 n n n
WWU Mu¨nster 957 n 8 62 47,6 n y n
RWTH Aachen 1031 n 6 10 19,9 n n n
U Hamburg 1278 n 8 62 47,6 n n n
Continued on next page
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Table 6 – continued from previous page
Website
Traffic Account Min. Size Min. Accepts Places User
Rank created? Length Charset Strength Ads? Ads? Choice
U Duisburg-Essen 1139 n 8 62 47,6 n n n
FAU Erlangen-
Nu¨rnberg
2664 n 4 10 13,3 n n n
Universities with top CS departments
RWTH Aachen 1031 n 6 10 19,9 n n n
U Augsburg 3355 n 8 36 41,4 n n n
Jacobs U Bremen 15549 n 6 10 19,9 n y n
U Magdeburg 3750 n 6 34 30,5 n n n
Hasso-Plattner-Inst.
Potsdam
16678 y 1 10 3,3 n n n
U Bayreuth 2363 n 8 10 26,6 n n n
TU Darmstadt 1990 y 9 96 59,3 n n n
FAU Erlangen-
Nu¨rnberg
2210 n 4 10 13,3 n n n
U Konstanz 3656 n 8 36 41,4 n n n
U des Saarlandes
Saarbru¨cken
2368 n 6 36 31,0 n n n
Government Sites
bundestag.de 2101 n 8 62 47,6 n n n
arbeitsagentur.de 97 n 8 62 47,6 n n n
bundesregierung.de 3440 n 8 62 47,6 n n n
bund.de 436 n 8 62 47,6 n n n
destatis.de 2240 n 8 96 52,7 n n n
bayern.de 245 n 8 44 43,7 n n n
nrw.de 309 n 8 10 26,6 n n n
europa.eu 377 n 8 10 26,6 n n n
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Figure 6: Histograms of the average PCP strength for all three samples along the different categories of
websites.
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